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BOOK REVIEWS

Skeptical Theism: New Essays, ed. Trent Dougherty and Justin P. McBrayer.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 322 pages. $30 (paperback).
JEFF SNAPPER, University of Notre Dame
This volume provides a comprehensive entry point for professional philosophers into the current state of evidential arguments like the following
(a God-justifying good for an evil is a good that would morally justify God
in permitting it if God were to exist):
Evidential Argument
E1 There are many evils for which we can find no God-justifying goods.
(Evil premise)
E2 If there are many evils for which we can find no God-justifying
goods then it is reasonable to believe that at least one evil has no
God-justifying good. (Noseeum premise)
E3 It is reasonable to believe that if at least one evil has no God-justifying good, then there is no God. (All-good premise)
E4 If it is reasonable to believe p and it is reasonable to believe if p then q,
then it is reasonable to believe q. (Reasonable belief closure premise)
Therefore,
It is reasonable to believe that there is no God.
This argument is stated in terms of reasonable belief. Similar arguments
can be stated in terms of justified belief, probability, and credences or
degrees of belief. Although William Rowe was the first to explicitly formulate an evidential argument (“The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties
of Atheism, American Philosophical Quarterly 16 [1979]: 335–341), there are
now a variety of evidential arguments. Likewise, Stephen Wykstra was
the first to systematically state a skeptical theistic reply (“The Humean
Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils
of ‘Appearance,’” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 [1984]:
73–93), but there are now a variety of skeptical theisms. A central theme
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of skeptical theisms is that humans should not expect to be able to identify God-justifying goods for most of the evils we know of because of the
epistemic distance between us and God. If so, then it is reasonable for
skeptical theists to reject the Noseeum premise.
The current volume shows that evidential arguments and skeptical theist replies raise more questions than they answer, ranging from
commitment to global skepticism and moral paralysis to conflict with
commonsense and Christian virtue. The book is divided into four sections
that address knowledge and epistemic humility, conditions of reasonable
epistemic access, skeptical theism’s implications for theism, and skeptical
theism’s implications for morality. The book is very nicely balanced with
a variety of atheists, agnostics, and theists engaged in charitable and constructive debate. However, with twenty-two authors providing a variety
of fine-grained arguments I here comment only on knowledge, epistemic
humility, and conditions of reasonable epistemic access.
Knowledge and Epistemic Humility
Jonathan Matheson begins the section by arguing that strong skeptical
theism implies that skeptical theists have no justification for believing the
Noseeum premise simply because skeptical theism is true, and so they are
not justified in believing that some evils have no God-justifying goods on
the basis of Noseeum. However, phenomenal conservatism, the thesis that
“if it seems to S as if p then S thereby has at least prima facie justification
for believing p,” provides independent justification for even a skeptical
theist’s belief in such evils. If it seems to Sam the skeptical theist as if some
evil lacks a God-justifying good, then Sam thereby has some justification
for believing it. So, Matheson reasons, phenomenal conservatism is incompatible with strong skeptical theism. But phenomenal conservatism
is compatible with weak skeptical theism, the thesis that being on balance
justified in believing skeptical theism fully defeats any justification she has
for believing Noseeum. Matheson recommends weak, rather than strong,
skeptical theism to phenomenal conservatives. One reply Matheson does
not consider is that a strong skeptical theist could consistently endorse
phenomenal conservatism and deny that it ever seems to any skeptical
theist as if some evil lacks a God-justifying good. Perhaps, as Wykstra argues (“The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering”),
it seems to a theist as if an evil E is a gratuitous evil only if, if E were
not gratuitous, it would not seem gratuitous; but, per skeptical theism, it
would seem gratuitous even if it weren’t, and so no theist is entitled to the
“it seems as if” claim.
Trent Dougherty agrees with Matheson that weak skeptical theism is
compatible with phenomenal conservatism, but thinks the defeat can also
go in the other direction. While Sam’s justification for his skeptical theism
may defeat his direct justification for belief in gratuitous evil (evil that has
no God-justifying good), his direct justification for belief in gratuitous evil
might instead defeat his justification for skeptical theism. It just depends
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upon which of Sam’s seemings (that skeptical theism is true vs. that some
evil is gratuitous) are stronger for Sam. I agree with Dougherty. Anyone
who has considered two sets of incompatible theses that enjoy roughly
equal evidential support knows what it is like to repeatedly switch views
on a topic. Perhaps some skeptical theists occasionally find themselves
believing that some evils really do not have any justifying goods, and perhaps they are justified in doing so for at least a time. (There is a difficulty
though. Suppose Sam, reading some tragic news article, suddenly realizes
he was, for a moment there, believing in gratuitous evils. As a serious
skeptical theist, Sam will quickly “turn that car around,” and admonish himself for so hastily believing in gratuitous evils since his skeptical
theism rules them out. The difficulty is that the natural knee-jerk reaction
to certain reports of evil is belief in gratuitous evil, but the skeptical theist
knows this and thinks he has found an adequate reply. So rather than interpret his occasional dabble in gratuitous evil as a genuine case of direct
justification defeating his justification for skeptical theism, the skeptical
theist is more likely to interpret his doxastic slippage as a fleeting failure
of rationality.)
John DePoe defends positive skeptical theism—skeptical theism plus the
thesis that “if there is a God, we should expect the world to contain some
seemingly gratuitous evils” (40), because the existence of apparently gratuitous evils produces certain goods that God would desire. The two kinds
of goods produced are (i) an epistemic distance between God and humans
that we need in order to have genuine faith in God, and (ii) a provocation for ``some of the greatest human acts of love and compassion” (39).
A person who considers what appears to be an evil for which there is no
moral justification—but for which there must be a justification given the
existence of God—acutely senses the epistemic distance between herself
and God, and thereby is made better able to have genuine faith in this
being whose epistemic powers she now better appreciates. Likewise, a
person confronted by apparently gratuitous evil feels sharp compassion
for those afflicted by the evil, in a way that produces more genuine and
sacrificial aid than would be produced were the evil apparently deserved
or just. While I like DePoe’s line of reasoning, one might object that the evil
produced by apparently gratuitous evil (even if not actually gratuitous)
morally outweighs these goods (e.g., war and rape are worse than the
good of epistemic distance and selfless compassion) such that, on balance,
we would not expect apparently gratuitous evil if God exists.
Chris Tucker shows that Noseeum gets part of its intuitive pull from
a conflation of exact representation with approximate representation. A
sample of dogs is exactly representative of all dogs with respect to being
brown just in case, if n% of the dogs in that sample are brown, then exactly
n% of all dogs are brown. A sample of cats is approximately representative of all cats with respect to being black just in case, if n% of the cats in
that sample are black, then n% ± 3% of all cats are black. These distinct
representation relations yield non-equivalent versions of Noseeum:
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Approximate Noseeum
If there are many evils for which humans can find no God-justifying
goods then (because the sample of evils humans have inspected is approximately representative of all evils with respect to having a God-justifying good) probably at least one of them, ± 3%, has no God-justifying
good.
Exact Noseeum
If there are many evils for which humans can find no God-justifying
goods then (because the sample of evils humans have inspected is exactly representative of all evils with respect to having a God-justifying
good) probably at least one of them has no God-justifying good.
Approximate Noseeum is pretty plausible. But the evidential argument
is valid only if Noseeum is understood as Exact Noseeum. And because
skeptical theists have “undefeated reason to withhold judgment whether”
Exact Noseeum is true, they have an adequate reply to the argument (48).
Todd Long defends a minimal skeptical theism from charges of moral
and religious skepticism. His main defensive thesis is that skeptical
theistic Christians should “maintain humility about many matters moral
and epistemic, a humility that engenders a modest skepticism” (74). Yet he
also affirms that the skeptical theist’s moral and religious beliefs can be justified on her total evidence (72–73). So Long here distinguishes knowing
vs. justifiably believing moral and religious truths. I agree that everyone
should humbly grant they do not (always) know many of the moral and
religious theses they justifiably believe. But I have difficulty seeing how
these facts defend skeptical theism from charges of wider skepticism.
Saying only that the skeptical theist “sometimes finds herself performing
acts of service that she has reason to believe are good, in light of her total
evidence at the relevant time; thus, she is often epistemically justified in
believing that performing some action is the morally right thing to do”
raises the objection without answering it. Presumably, when facing moral
decisions, a salient part of her total evidence just is her justified belief in
skeptical theism which, goes the objection, undercuts her justification for
believing that a particular action is the morally right one.
E. J. Coffman, following Dougherty and Tucker, points out that Long’s
minimal skeptical theism does not prevent a person from having noninferential justification for belief in gratuitous evils, and so minimal skeptical theism does not “completely incapacitate” evidential arguments (76).
He then argues, along reductio lines, that Tucker’s criticism of Michael
Bergmann’s skeptical theism is internally inconsistent. Coffman’s central
idea is that if a person has undefeated reason to withhold judgment on
whether her perception of total moral (dis)value of some event E accurately
reflects the actual total moral (dis)value of E, then that person does not
have an undefeated non-inferentially justified belief that E’s total moral
(dis)value is, say, negative. For example, if Tim has (undefeated) reason
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to remain agnostic concerning whether what he perceives to be an overall bad thing (a fawn dying slowly in a forest fire) accurately reflects its
overall badness, then Tim does not have an undefeated justified belief that
the fawn’s slow death is, overall, bad. After all, if Tim had an undefeated
justified belief that the fawn’s slow death is, overall, bad, then he would
be able to unqualifiedly trust his initial perception of its overall badness—
he would not have an undefeated reason for not trusting it. I agree with
Coffman and echo his sentiment that Michael Bergmann’s ST4—“We have
no good reason for thinking that the total moral value or disvalue we perceive in certain complex states of affairs accurately reflects the total moral
value or disvalue they really have” (12)—is important to the full skeptical
theistic response. More generally, it seems that for skeptical theism to fully
answer the evidential challenge it needs to block non-inferential justification (on the basis of seemings or whatever else) for belief in gratuitous
evil, and ST4 looks like a good start.
N. N. Trakakis presents the following paradox for Christianity. Each
of the following claims seems true but they cannot all be true: Christians
ought to be humble (and ought implies can), Christians have privileged access to absolute truth (dogma), but, anyone with that kind of access cannot
be humble. Trakakis argues against the fourth claim. According to Eastern
Orthodoxy, dogma is a gracious gift from God that humbles the person to
whom it is given; or as he puts it, “[A]n awareness of the gifted nature of
all that we are and have, including our knowledge of God, almost spontaneously brings about in us a profound humility and gratitude” (97). I
like the solution and hope it is true. But what do we say about the numerous Christians with true religious beliefs who are smug, self-satisfied, and
doxastically pushy? I suspect the Orthodox answer is that though their religious beliefs are true, they do not rise to the level of knowledge precisely
because they fail to realize that dogma is a gift. If so, then knowledge
of God requires awareness that theological truths are gifts. But botanical
and hydroelectric knowledge have no such requirement. This suggests
that subject matter affects the conditions needed for knowledge, which is
rather surprising if true.
Debating Conditions On ReasoNable Epistemic Access (CORNEA)
Kenneth Boyce opens the second section of the book by explaining why
some think that skeptical theism implies global skepticism. The salient
part of that objection goes as follows. Due to failure to accurately discern
total moral (dis)value, skeptical theists have good reason to withhold belief from the proposition that God is not systematically deceiving us. If so,
then it is not reasonable to believe that proposition. If it is not reasonable
to believe that proposition, then it is likewise not reasonable to believe
that we have hands. Boyce then replies by showing how one might have
good reason (from perceptual limitations) to withhold belief from p and
at the same time reasonably believe p based on distinct evidence. The
inaccuracy of our perceptions of total (dis)value provides a good reason
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to refrain from believing that God is not deceiving us. But independent
reasoning provides a distinct reason to believe it. In particular, it is reasonable to believe, conditional on our background knowledge and vivid hand
perceptions, that it is antecedently very likely that God is not deceiving us
(provided we lack evidence to the contrary). Since our perceptual limitations give us no reason to believe either that God is or is not deceiving us,
we do lack evidence to the contrary. Though our inaccurate perception of
value brings us to the brink of skepticism, our vivid hand perceptions pull
us back!
M. J. Almeida first diagnoses a problem he sees with standard evidential arguments and then offers an improved argument. Let an outweighing
good (“o-good”) be a good the value of which outweighs the disvalue of
the collection of evils it entails. Let a God-purposed good (“g-good”) be an
outweighing good that entails theism. Almeida’s objection is that standard
evidential arguments focus on g-goods when they should be focused on
o-goods that do not entail theism. What we want to know, thinks Almeida,
is the likelihood that we know of some o-good for an evil E, given that there
is an o-good for E (119). What is less interesting, he argues, is the likelihood that we know of some g-good (an o-good that entails theism) for E,
given that there is a g-good for E. In reply, anyone who thinks that God is
necessary if possible and thinks God possible will fail to see any difference
between those questions because everything entails a necessary being. But
perhaps the idea is either that evidential arguments are aimed at agnostics, or that, at least while considering evidential arguments, necessitarian
theists are supposed to be agnostics, even about the possibility of theism.
Almeida’s improved argument turns on the following thesis: the probability that no known o-good entails E, given that some o-good entails E,
is less than the probability that no known g-good entails E, given that some
g-good entails E. Or to paraphrase, it is more likely that we would find an
o-good if it were there, than it is that we would find a g-good if it were
there. For, though we may rightly doubt (given the epistemic distance between God and us) our ability to find g-goods were they to exist, we have
no parallel reason to doubt our ability to find o-goods were they to exist.
For, the existence of an o-good is not (we are supposing, for the sake of
argument) contingent upon the designs of a vastly superior mind. One
could reply here that atheistic consequentialists should be just as skeptical about finding o-goods as skeptical theists are about finding g-goods
because the long-term total consequences of the consequentialist atheist’s
actions are no better known to him than the long-term total consequences
of the skeptical theist’s actions are known to her.
The last series of papers in this section begins with Paul Draper’s wonderfully clear explanation of four evidential support relations in probabilistic terms. He then argues that Wykstranian skeptical theism succeeds at
one thing but fails at another. It successfully shows that failure to explain
evil does not confirm atheism. But skeptical theism fails to show that evil
does not confirm atheism.
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Timothy Perrine and Stephen Wykstra reply, not to Draper’s contribution to this volume, but instead to an argument he gives elsewhere. They
argue that a moderate form of skeptical theism may be able to resist one
of Draper’s Humean evidential arguments. Unlike Rowe-style evidential
arguments, Humean evidential arguments do not claim that failure to
detect certain goods lowers the epistemic probability that they exist. Instead, Draper’s evidential argument states that naturalism is simpler than
theism and more accurately predicts our total moral data, and partly for
that reason, theism is improbable given that moral data (the probability of
theism, given the moral data and Draper’s background knowledge, is less
than 0.5). In support of the prediction claim, Draper provides a thought
experiment where two aliens with human-level cognitive abilities travel to
Earth and make predictions. Both Natty (a naturalist) and Theo (a theist)
acquire information about Earth’s biosphere in the following order: the
biological facts, pain and pleasure, flourishing and languishing, virtue
and vice, triumph and tragedy, and finally, good and evil. Prior to each
stage, each alien makes a prediction about the distribution of the qualities in the next stage. After each stage, each alien updates her background
knowledge before making a predication about the next stage. Draper’s
view is that Natty’s predictions will, overall, be more accurate than Theo’s
because Natty bases her predications on naturalism while Theo bases
hers on theism. This thought experiment, then, supports the premise that
“naturalism has a better predictive fit than theism regarding the data of
good and evil” (145). In response, Perrine and Wykstra explain a moderate
skeptical theism they think fits the total moral data at least as well as naturalism. They recommend that Theo, who may have been a naive theist
(a theist who believes it likely that some theodicy is successful), should
convert to skeptical theism, in order to improve her predictive powers. In
reply, Draper argues that even if there is a version of skeptical theism that
fits the moral data as well as naturalism, still, the probability of theism
simpliciter, given the moral data and his background knowledge, remains
less than 0.5. So adding skeptical theism is no help.
Lara Buchak clarifies this disagreement by considering two ways one
might give up naive theism. Common to both is the assumption that when
a person faces a group of incompatible theses that explain some data, she
proportions her credences among the theses such that the sum of those
credences is 1.
To illustrate, suppose I lost my keys. After scouring the house I face
three explanations: a thief stole my keys (stolen), I failed to find them
even though I searched their location (error), and my keys are in a location I have not yet searched (elsewhere). If these are the only candidate
theses and I have a high view of my ability to find my keys when I search
their location, then I proportion my credences like this: Pr (stolen/b) = 0.1,
Pr (error/b) = 0.3, Pr (elsewhere/b) = 0.6.
Having distributed my credences among candidates in this way,
upon gaining new evidence that rules out one of the candidates (sets its
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probability to 0) there are two ways to distribute my credence from the debunked theory. I could distribute my credence across the other candidates
such that the ratios between them change (“unevenly”), or I could distribute my credences such that the ratios do not change (“evenly”). Which
way I in fact distribute depends upon what effect the debunking has upon
the prior probabilities (priors) I assign to the other theses. If it equally affects their priors proportional to each other then I distribute evenly. If the
debunking instead affects some of the priors non-proportionally, then I
distribute unevenly.
Return to the keys. I discover that I have searched for the keys everywhere—there is no location they might occupy that I have not searched.
So Pr (elsewhere/b) changes from 0.6 to 0. This leaves 0.6 to be distributed
between (stolen) and (error). The original ratio was 3 (error) : 1 (stolen).
Discovering that I searched everywhere does not raise the prior of (stolen)
for me at all, since failure to spot keys does not even mildly support failure to see key thieves roaming through my house. So I unevenly distribute
it all to (error), resulting in Pr (error/b) = 0.9 and Pr (stolen/b) = 0.1.
Return to the keys again but with a different discovery. This time I discover that I have searched for my keys everywhere and that there has been
a local rash of key thefts by sneaky children. Again, the Pr (elsewhere/b)
changes from 0.6 to 0, leaving 0.6 to be distributed. What I have discovered
this time, though, not only rules out one theory (elsewhere), it also raises
the prior of (stolen). So this time, I might distribute the 0.6 evenly among
the other theses, resulting in Pr (error/b) = 0.75 and Pr (stolen/b) = 0.25,
thereby retaining the 3 (error) : 1 (stolen) ratio. (Notice that the background
knowledge (“b”) in the updated credences includes information not in the
original background knowledge—namely, that (elsewhere) is false.)
With a handle on two ways we might update our credences (evenly
vs. unevenly), let us now consider the effect of this distinction upon the
Draper/Perrine and Wykstra disagreement. The question there is how,
exactly, Theo should update his credences (evenly vs. unevenly) once he
gives up naive theism. The idea suggested by Perrine and Wykstra is that
Theo would, at some point in Draper’s process, switch to skeptical theism,
and then restart the process making predictions based on skeptical theism
instead.
The question that Theo is trying to answer is `Why is the total moral
data the way it is?’ The three candidates are naive theism (NT)—God exists and the distribution is driven by humanly-identifiable goods, skeptical
theism (ST)—God exists and the distribution is inscrutable because of epistemic distance, and naturalism (N)—there is no God and the distribution is
inscrutable due to randomness and/or ignorance of initial conditions. Prior
to seeing the moral data (D), Theo, suppose, assigns them the following
probabilities because she is a theist, Pr (NT/D&b) = 0.7, Pr (ST/D&b) = 0.2,
Pr (N/D&b) = 0.1. After getting the distribution data and failing to find
the goods, Theo’s credence in naive theism drops to zero. The question is
how she should update her credences in the remaining two theses. Should
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they go evenly to Pr (ST/D&b) = .66 and Pr (N/D&b) = .33 or instead unevenly towards skeptical theism (Pr (ST/D&b) = 0.9 and Pr (N/D&b) = 0.1),
or rather perhaps unevenly towards naturalism (Pr (ST/D&b) = 0.2 and
Pr (N/D&b) = 0.8)? The answer depends on whether Theo takes naturalism
and theism to be empirically (dis)confirmable theses. If Theo thinks the empirical facts have no bearing on their prior probability, then she will update
unevenly towards ST, because she begins as a theist and the distribution
of pleasure and pain (being an empirical fact) have no impact on her prior
for naturalism. But even if she thinks they are empirically (dis)confirmable
and she evenly distributes (since skeptical theism and naturalism make
about the same predictions), she still takes skeptical theism to be twice as
likely as naturalism (.66 vs. .33), due to her priors. Even if she takes empirical
facts to (dis)confirm these theses, since skeptical theism and naturalism
make approximately the same predictions, she has no reason to update unevenly towards naturalism. But of course, just the reverse will be the case
for Natty, the naturalist alien. She will take naturalism to be at least twice as
likely as skeptical theism (even after her credence for naive theism drops to
zero). She will face very similar (just with “reversed” priors) circumstances
and her answers will be a mirror image of Theo’s. The upshot of Buchak’s
paper for this disagreement, it seems to me, is that though there are different ways to update belief in the face of new evidence, in this case the
differences are swamped by the priors and the fact that the two competing
theses, even if empirically (dis)confirmable, make the same empirical predictions. In the probabilistic terms Draper uses to model his Humean argument, even assuming that empirical facts affect prior probabilities, whether
the Pr (D/N&b) is greater than, less than, or equal to Pr (D/ST&b) is still
determined by an individual’s priors for skeptical theism and naturalism.

